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COMMENTS
ONE PROBLEM WITH USING AN ESCROW
TO DETER NATIONALIZATION
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
In their article, "Escrow: a Private Law Device Adapted for the
Protection of Foreign Investment,"' Michael Kitay and Robert
Trout attempt to formulate a method of protecting investments in
the less developed countries from nationalization.'
There are three basic considerations involved in any attempt to
deal with nationalizations: compensating the investor, deterring the
host country from nationalizing, and making the scheme acceptable
to the parties involved. Kitay and Trout devote most of their discussion and analysis to setting up the escrow fund in such a way as to
compensate the investor for any nationalization and with making the
escrow attractive, or at least acceptable to the investor, the escrow
agent, and the host country. They give relatively little consideration
to the deterrent effect which the device might have.
This comment will deal with one aspect of making the escrow an
effective deterrent to nationalization. Unless the escrow fund is set
up with care it may become an incentive rather than a deterrent to
nationalization.
According to the plan which Kitay and Trout have devised, the
prospective investor would negotiate an escrow agreement with the
host country. The agreement would set up an escrow fund with a
mutually acceptable agent 3'-an international bank or monetary
agency or possibly a regional development bank of the region in
which the host country is located.' Each year the investor would
deposit a percentage of the host country's share of the profits from
the enterprise and a percentage of the taxes owed by the enterprise
to the host country into the escrow fund. Each year's contribution
to the fund would remain there for a number of years set by the
escrow agreement and would then be released to the host country.'
1. 13 Va.J. Int'l L. 48 (1972).
2. Throughout this Comment I have used the term "nationalization" instead of "expropriation" or "confiscation." Expropriation implies that effective compensation for the

enterprise was made to the investor. Confiscation implies that it was not. Since this Comment envisions a situation in which the issue of effective compensation is not yet raised,
neither word is appropriate. I have therefore used nationalization to mean a taking by the
host country without any implication that compensation was or was not adequate.
3. Kitay and Trout, supra note 1, at 51-53.
4. Id. at 53-54. See Knop, Regional Development Banks, 4 J. Law & Econ. Dev. 93
(1969), for a comparison of several of the regional development banks.
5. Kitay and Trout, supra note 1, at 51-52.
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For instance, if the fund were set up for five years, after the fund
had been in operation for a complete cycle, there would be five
years' contributions in the fund at any one time. If the host country
expropriated the enterprise, this fund would go to compensate the
investor.6
The period of the fund and the percentage of the host country's
share of the profits and taxes to be contributed would be fixed in
such a way as to provide adequate compensation to the investor.
The main attraction of the escrow fund, however, is not its ability
to compensate the investor-Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) insurance can also do that 7 -its main attraction is its possible
ability to deter the host country from nationalizing the enterprise.
After all, the investor does not make investments so that he can be
compensated at some later date. He invests in order to make money.
Therefore he has a primary interest in avoiding or deterring nationalization.
Absent OPIC insurance or the escrow device, what does the
nationalizing state lose when it nationalizes property of an American
citizen without prompt or effective compensation? It will lose its
reputation, if it has one, of being a safe place to invest. It will be
subject to more or less pressure from the United States State Department. It may even be threatened with loss of aid under the Hickenlooper Amendment.' Directly, it will lose nothing by nationalizing.
The investor receives nothing from the host country unless the State
Department can negotiate a settlement.
One of the main deficiencies of OPIC is that the consequences for
the nationalizing state are almost the same as if there were no OPIC
at all. 'The United States government takes over the rights of the
investor in return for OPIC compensation. The State Department
may therefore exert more pressure on the nationalizing state than if
it were merely asserting the rights of the investor. Again, however,
the host country suffers no direct loss from nationalizing. The deterrent effect of the actions which are taken by the United States
government is probably minimal.
In the case whtere the host country nationalizes an enterprise pro6. Id.
7. 22 U.S.C.A. § § 2194-2198 (Supp. 1973). See J. Loomis, Public Money Sources for
Overseas Trade and Investment (1963), for a discussion of the avadability and coverage of
OPIC insurance. However, see Adams, The Emerging Law of Dispute Settlement under the
United States Investment Insurance Program, 3 Law & Policy in Int'l Bus. 101 (1971), for a
survey of the problems in obtaining compensation under OPIC insurance.
8. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e) (1964). Eder, Expropriation: Hickenlooper and Hereafter, 4
Int'l Lawyer 611 (1970), discusses the application and effect of the Hickenlooper Amendment.
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tected by an escrow agreement, the loss to the host country is
theoretically immediate. It loses a significant amount of hard cutrency. If the nationalizing government is radical or revolutionary,
even this direct loss will probably be no deterrent. To a more moderate government, however, especially if it is having balance of payments problems and if it has used the money in the fund as collateral
for loans, loss of the fund should act as a strong deterrent. If it does
not have an immediate interest in the fund, though, the fund will not
act as a deterrent, but as an incentive to nationalize. A simple hypothetical will illustrate this point. If the term of the escrow is five
years; the net worth of the enterprise is $1,000,000; the average
annual net profits are $300,000; the host country's share in the
profits and taxes is 75% or $225,000; and 75% of that or $180,000 is
deposited in the escrow each year; then the escrow will contain
$900,000 at any time after the agreement has been in operation for
at least five years. Beginning in the sixth year and every year thereafter, the host country will receive its usual 25% of its share or
$45,000 plus the $180,000 released from the escrow for a total of
$225,000. If the host country were to nationalize, however, and if it
could continue to run the enterprise by itself, its annual income from
the enterprise would immediately jump to $300,000. It would therefore gain $75,000 annually by nationalizing, the investor would be
substantially compensated, and the host country would not be an
international outcast for not compensating. In such a case the escrow
would really be a prepayment plan for nationalization. The host
country does not lose anything by forfeiture of the fund since the
fund is perpetual. The only way that the host country could ever get
the fund would be if the enterprise were dissolved. In that case the
original investment would be repatriated and the host country would
lose it in any case.
Therefore, unless the host country has an immediate interest in
the fund, some benefit immediately derived from the fund that
would be lost if the fund were forfeit, the fund is no deterrent to
nationalization. Under an escrow agreement, then, the host country
must have the right to use the fund as collateral for loans or in some
similar way. The host country must have something substantial to
lose if it forfeits the fund by nationalizing the enterprise. Only then
will the fund be a deterrent.
WILLIAM DARLING

